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Abstract
Real-life conjectures do not come with instructions saying whether they they should be proven or,
instead, refuted. Yet, as we now know, in either case the final argument produced had better be
not just convincing but actually verifiable in as much detail as our need for eliminating risk might
require. For those who do not happen to have direct access to the realm of mathematical truths,
the modern field of formalized mathematics has quite a few lessons to contribute, and one might
pay heed to what it has to say, for instance, about: the importance of employing proof strategies;
the fine control of automation in unraveling the structure of a certain proof object; reasoning
forward from the givens and backward from the goals, in developing proof scripts; knowing when
and how definitions and identities apply in a helpful way, and when they do not apply; seeing
proofs [and refutations] as dynamical objects, not reflected by the static derivation trees that
Proof Theory wants them to be.
I believe that the great challenge for teachers and learners resides currently less on the avail-
ability of suitable generic tools than in combining them wisely in view of their preferred education
paradigms and introducing them in a way that best fits their specific aims, possibly with the help
of intelligent online interactive tutoring systems. As a proof of concept, a computerized proof
assistant that makes use of several successful tools already freely available on the market and
that takes into account some of the above findings about teaching and learning Logic is hereby
introduced. To fully account for our informed intuitions on the subject it would seem that a little
bit extra technology would still be inviting, but no major breakthrough is really needed: We are
talking about tools that are already within our reach to develop, as the fruits of collaborative
effort.
1998 ACM Subject Classification K.3.1 Computer Uses in Education; F.4.1 Mathematical Logic
Keywords and phrases mathematical thinking; computer-assisted instruction; proof assistants;
intelligent tutoring systems
1 Ask yourself again: What is a Proof?
Non-obvious arguments have interesting inner structures: givens may be assumed to be
connected to goals by directed loop-free finite paths; each node of such a structure would be
annotated with some statement; the finite collection of all edges concurring in a node Sm
would itself be annotated by a justification according to which the statements S1, S2, . . . , Sjm
contained in their other endpoints would suffice for an appropriate inferential link to be
recognized; source nodes would be labelled in such a way that some of them could be
identified as temporary suppositions, and the others as assumptions that would have been
employed as starting points for the corresponding argument. If one puts the corresponding
directed acyclic graph upside-down and unravels the paths to avoid a node to be visited
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more than once, the sink nodes become roots of their own derivation trees. While checking
that such an argument has been constructed flawlessly according to a number of inference
rules set in advance essentially reduces to a rather costless tree traversal task, the very
task of constructing the goal-directed argument, starting from the initial given hypotheses
is however a potentially costly problem that might require a lot of ingenuity to be solved.
However, real-life problems will often demand practitioners to construct precisely this kind of
interwoven structures concerning a given conjecture without a hint on whether this conjecture
is true or false — and often the arguments supporting its truth are quite distinct from the
arguments supporting its falsity. It should be no wonder that students often have difficulty
with mastering the techniques for going about and develop their own arguments, and tutors
often have a hard time teaching students how to proceed.
Many tasks related to exploring conjectures by either proving or refuting them may be
fully automated, as, for instance, in cases in which complete decision procedures are known
to exist. Arguably, however, if students are to be more than button-pushers for imported
technological toys that play by themselves, they have more to learn by implementing the
decision procedures than by actually using their tools to evaluate whatever conjecture needs
to be checked. At any rate, I believe students can learn many important skills even when
working with fully automatable theories, as long as they approach them in a productive way,
and I believe tutors have a lot to learn from the many advancements that have been made
in the fast-growing field of formalized mathematics. The teaching principles subsequently
discussed in the present paper are intended to provide evidence for such beliefs.
2 Lessons from formalized mathematics
Mathematics in the early 19th century was navigating a sea of uncalculated logical gaps and
gluts, with few safe harbors in which to dock. Its non-systematic use of axioms and relatively
careless use of definitions, found amid a baroque prose that allowed for much ambiguity and
imprecision to crop in, resulted in a disgraceful state of affairs in which the mathematical
vessel appeared to be going adrift. Disaster seemed imminent, had it not been by the masters
of the trade not letting it sink. The forerunners of the now venerable foundational schools
strove to provide firm grounds for Mathematics, and Logic had important roles to play in
such quest. ‘Safe’ proof methods and techniques were progressively identified, and stricter
standards were imposed for an argument to be considered acceptable. In the following
century the very notion of proof became a mathematical object in itself, and one whose
characterization and properties were to be deeply investigated.
The works of Gentzen and other wise forerunners of Proof Theory have not only shaped
the way we now think about proofs, but have heavily influenced the ulterior design of
mechanized proof-assistants. As a matter of fact, many lessons in Logic seem to have been
made clearer by implementations of such proof-assistants than they had been for several
earlier generations of ‘pure’ mathematical logicians, or early type theorists — as an example,
one could argue that the difference in the roles played by free and by bound variables becomes
more striking if you think of them as sorted into quantifier rules that introduce parameters in
contrast to those that introduce unknowns. My contention in the present paper is that paying
more attention into how novice students interact with such tools for doing computer-assisted
math might help understanding other important lessons that would have remained unheard.
I propose to discuss some such largely understated lessons in what follows.
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Seeing proofs [and refutations] as dynamical objects. You give your student an exam to
be solved with pencil-and-paper. She has to write a convincing argument that will lead to
either proving or refuting a given conjecture. Having been rightly taught that a mathematical
proof is about adequately justifying her conclusions and not about providing an explanation
of her thought processes (cf. [13]), the student hands back to you a scratch of the logical
structure of her argument, in the form of a derivation tree. How did she arrive to it? You
might never know. To the best of your knowledge, she might have received the full argument
ready from the dancing hands of Shiva — or maybe from a fellow student.
This time you are the one scratching the skeleton of a proof in the blackboard, in front
of your student. Instead of cleanly proceeding from hypotheses to conclusion, or maybe
proceeding the other way around, you allow yourself some false starts, backtrack from dead
ends, get stuck here and there, and fail in every possible way — having an eye at what can be
learned from such repeated failures. You exhibit the full plethora of feelings that accompany
the process of inventing/discovering a proof, including the mixture of satisfaction and relief
when you manage to fill all the blanks that separate givens and goals. Your student will be
happy to follow you attentively, and then take a picture of the final result with her mobile
phone. When she arrives at home, though, she tries to retrace your steps, but does not
manage to reproduce the same derivation tree for the given conjecture — or to produce any
derivation tree at all.
In both situations, what is not being captured by the student is the dynamical aspect
of the proof object. The complete derivation tree that you find at your student’s exam is
wholly static, and the media in which it has been registered does not allow you to replay its
construction. The picture taken by the student of the proof that resulted from your toil is
only the last frame of a movie. It might be the climax of the movie, but, more often than not,
it does not allow the interested spectator to recover details of the full story that led to it.
What’s worst, in the paper or in the blackboard, an entirely correct proof might have
been produced in the wrong way, and you will never get a hint of that just by looking at the
final derivation tree that represents such a proof. For instance, consider the usual derivation
of the quantifier shift that allows one to conclude that (∀x)(∀y)P (x, y) and (∀y)(∀x)P (x, y)
are equivalent formulas. Of course, to achieve your initial goal what you should do is start
by fixing a certain y1 to represent an arbitrary member of your universe of discourse and
set as a new goal the proof of (∀x)P (x, y1). Next, you fix an arbitrary x1 and set as a
new goal the proof of P (x1, y1). So far you have invoked two applications of a logical rule
often called ‘∀-introduction’. Because you still need to prove P (x1, y1) from (∀x)(∀y)P (x, y),
two applications of ‘∀-elimination’ will now do, if you choose the obvious witnesses for the
instantiations. Pick your preferred proof-assistant and write the proof starting from the
given, applying ∀-elimination (twice) and then try applying ∀-introduction. You will fail: the
instances that you will produce are not ‘arbitrary’, but only specific objects of your domain;
you should not expect to generalize from them.
However essential is dynamics to a proof, the standard theoretical treatises on Proof
Theory still choose to simply ignore it. Rather than defining proofs as sequences of collections
of derivations trees each with their own purpose and history, a proof is commonly identified
simply with the final derivation tree that magically gather all the former trees into a whole.
Most of the movie has been lost in the process, as spectators just look at the final credits in
awe. Yet all practitioners know perfectly well that something fundamental is missing.
Playing and replaying proofs. The last example in the previous discussion has already
illustrated a common feature of proof dynamics that is taken into account by a practitioner
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writing a so-called proof script for a given conjecture: reasoning may proceed forward from
the givens or backwards from the goals. For instance, given two families of sets, F and G,
a student might want to prove that x ∈ ⋃F follows from x ∈ ⋃(F ∩ G). Now, reasoning
backwards from the initial goal, proving x ∈ ⋃F means going through the so-called ‘∃-
introduction’ rule, where the new goal would consist in finding a witness y ∈ F such that
x ∈ y. On the other hand, using the hypothesis x ∈ ⋃(F ∩ G) means going through the
so-called ‘∃-elimination’ rule, for in this case the procedure, reasoning forward from the given,
would consist in considering an arbitrary element z of F ∩ G such that x ∈ z. The student
will easily tie the two ends of the proof, of course, when she finds out she might choose y = z.
“If you can’t solve a problem, then there is an easier problem you can solve: find it.”
(cf. [9]). Flexible proof assistants will typically allow you to solve a problem by exploring
proofs in both directions, forward and backwards, to try and find that easier problem. Using
an analogy from programming language paradigms, proof languages used by proof assistants
might come in a declarative style that “resembles program source code more than mathematics”
or in a procedural style in which “one holds a dialogue with the computer” (cf. [15]). For the
obvious reasons, research efforts have been consistently devoted to developing a mathematical
vernacular for proof assistants (cf. [3]) that resembles the formal use of natural language
found in mathematical texts.1 Isn’t this a whole lot of work just to end up with something
that appears as if it had been done with pencil-and-paper? Well, this is where the analogy
breaks down. Note indeed that proofs described as scripts in a proof assistant can be executed
like any program. That allows one, in principle, to “describe not only what the machine
should do, but also why it should be doing it — a formal proof of correctness” (cf. [5]).
More on the power of computer-inspired analogies. Many a cognitive scientist has found
a common denominator with defenders of Artificial Intelligence in explaining the difference
between the mind and the brain in terms of an analogy to the difference between software
and hardware. Imperfect as any analogy, such an explanation will already allow for debates
to run, for instance, about the meaning and the roles of consciousness and emotions in the
resulting picture. More to the point, a little experience in programming or some experience
with proof assistants often help bringing forth some more specific and useful analogies. For
instance, a comparison that many students find compelling is the one that equates the
discharge of assumptions and the discharge of parameters in certain natural deduction proofs
to the destruction of local variables, in imperative programming, when leaving the scope
of functions to which they belong, and that equates non-discharged hypotheses to global
variables of a program. For another example, the familiarity with functions with type void,
in programming, not rarely appears to be advantageous to students striving to understand
the interpretations of nullary functions or nullary predicates.
Allegedly, a good education in Computer Science turns the apprentice more prone to
recognizing that many symbols for variables that appear in mathematical expressions are
actually bound to certain operators (such as summations, limits or integrals), or are bound
to hidden (universal) quantifiers, and so they might usefully be thought of as standing as
placeholders that allow for certain kinds of syntactic reductions. From an implementation
viewpoint, the conceptual understanding of the role of binding is in fact shared by computer
scientists more often with linguists than with mathematicians. On the same track, the
1 Mathematicians can be quite conservative, in fact, and even proposals to the effect that an effort should
be made to employ a more disciplined and structured use of language (cf. [6]) have for the most part
appeared to fell on deaf ears.
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insightful Curry-Howard correspondence that maps propositions to types, proofs to programs,
and proof simplification strategies to program evaluation strategies tends to be better appre-
ciated by those who have been exposed to the compilation routines of modern programming
languages or proof assistants.
And here is a final note on the seductive power of analogy. As with any search related to
problem solving, one way of thinking about proof search is as another example of disciplined
activity that benefits from intelligent guidance. Now, if one is still willing to defend that
“intellectual activity consists mainly of various kinds of search” (cf. [12]), then one should be
more than willing to build tools to let the students experiment with and search for their own
proofs, and invest on the partnership between students and their ‘intelligent machinery’.
When definitions apply [and when they do not]. There is no space here, nor is it my
intention, to discuss the role of definitions in the teaching and learning of mathematics. This
has been done with competence in [14], and elsewhere. The value of definitions that make
precise certain fundamental concepts should not be underestimated: It would not be (much
of) an exaggeration, for instance, to say that the whole of Logic amounts simply to the
study of a couple of capital definitions, namely, those of the concepts of satisfaction, proof,
computation, and valid reasoning.
For all that matters, and putting aside for a moment their cognitive role in reasoning,
I may here assume definitions to be dealt with through a simple rewriting: definiens is allowed
to replace definiendum, or vice-versa. Assuming the student can process such rewritings
while cleverly avoiding circular reasoning, assuming that the student competently grasps the
content of the definitions she is supposed to work with, and also assuming that the student
can make such definitions part of her technical repertoire, it still seems to me that insufficient
emphasis is put on knowing what to do when a defined term, operation or relation applies as
well as when it does not apply in the theory at hand. For instance, if set complement (\) is
defined in the usual way, what does it mean to reason from a hypothesis of the form c /∈ a\ b?
(novice students often have difficulty in recognizing in this the conditional assertion ‘if c ∈ a
then c ∈ b’) For a more important example, what does it mean for a statement not to follow
from a given set of hypotheses? Many students who claim to understand, respectively, the
notions of set complement and logical consequence still have difficulty giving useful answers
to the two previous questions.
Much of what has been noted as a problem about dealing with definitions extends to dealing
with identities (for which careless rewriting might in fact easily turn out nonterminating).
Universal statements concerning the failure of certain identities are seldom used in theories
that focus exclusively on equational reasoning. For the interested reader, I recall though a
nice example of the possible use of inequalities, in combination with automated proof search.
Recall that a Robbins algebra is a structure containing a commutative and associative binary
symbol + and a unary symbol ′ satisfying the equation (∀x)(∀y)((x′ + y′)′ + (x′ + y)′) = x.
A computerized proof that a Robbins algebra that contains an +-idempotent element is
Boolean was quickly found by supposing, by contradiction, the denial of another equation
which was known since 1933 to axiomatize the variety of Boolean algebras. This result ended
up representing a key step in the proof, entirely uncovered by an automated prover, that
all Robbins algebras are Boolean, settling a problem that had been open for more than six
decades (cf. [7]).
Finding the right balance between automation and our pedagogical purposes. Are com-
puterized proofs legible? And, to better start with, are they informative? How much will
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the students learn from them? While the first question might largely amount to a puzzle
for semiotics, the last question poses a challenge for educators. In the previous paragraph
I have just mentioned the ‘solution to the Robbins problem’. It should be noted that this
solution, which has resisted the attacks of generations of human provers, also proved to be
really hard for human checkers, for the substitutions required by the use of the equations
involved terms that were long and difficult to parse. In this sense, the first computerized
proofs that were automatically found seemed too unstructured and did not contribute much
in insight for their intrepid human readers.
So much for fully automated proving. As we mentioned before, the languages used by
interactive proof assistants aim at being flexible, and often contain ‘tacticals’ or ‘methods’
that allow one to fine tune the amount of automation one wants to introduce into the most
bureaucratic or relatively boring steps of a proof construction. In the case of large steps
done with automation, many proof assistants will allow one to inspect the structure of the
proof object that has been constructed by them, hidden from the users’ eyes. The students
directly involved in the very implementation of such tacticals or automated provers will no
doubt learn a lot from their service to the community. However, novice students that abuse
on proofs produced by a ‘blast’, followed by a seeming miracle, often fail to see how such
proofs relate to the problems they have when confronted with the simplest mathematical
conjectures. In that sense, it would seem to me that, for pedagogical purposes, automation
had better be introduced in really small doses.
Of course, it all depends on what we intend to teach. Take the example of classical
propositional logic, and their usual analytic tableaux or sequent systems. Both proof systems
are capable of originating simple decision procedures. However, if our purpose involves
capitalizing on the conceptual distinction between formal proofs and formal semantics,
tableaux tend to dangerously tread on the dividing line. Moreover, when done on pencil-
and-paper, the steps taken in the construction of tableaux are often left unjustified, as if the
derivation tree by itself would be straightforward to decipher. Arguably, and that will surely
depend on the way you teach them, much more flexible systems based on sequents would also
seem to pose some difficulties related to the understanding of formal semantics. Many will
contend, in fact, that natural deduction is superior as a proof system that allows students
to more easily construct a conceptual map in between the way they have been taught to
formulate their mathematical reasoning using regimented fragments of natural language and
their conversations with the machine. Not by chance, several interactive proof assistants in
the market do make use of some variety of natural deduction in their metalanguage. All
in all, if I may insist, assuming the chosen purpose of teaching structured mathematical
thinking, the motto should be: ‘Less automation Is More’.
On the role of proof strategies. Some proof systems are so robust that proofs written
in them are bound to terminate (by confirming or by refutating of a given conjecture) no
matter how you proceed in developing them. The odd worst-case scenario for usual analytic
tableaux for classical propositional logic, for instance, is known to be much more costly than
truth-tables, but if you persist long enough in decomposing your hypotheses, you will exhaust
any tableau, no longer being able in fact to further extend its branches by the addition of new
data. The first-order case, as it should be clear, is quite different in that respect: Already in
the examples we presented in the above paragraphs, interchanging the order in which the
quantifier rules were applied could easily lead to failed attempts at producing a proof.
Some other proof systems will only work well with a lot of external help. For many
decidable modal logics, for instance, some of the best proof systems available need loop-
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checkers to put an end to their proof-search procedures (cf. [8]). Some classic-like tableaux
for many-valued propositional logics —all such logics being obviously decidable— will only
be assured to produce terminating proofs if you abide to certain proof strategies (cf. [1, 2]).
Here again there would seem to be a task for proof-theorists: The lesson concerning the
importance of employing proof strategies is in fact general enough to suggest that a proof
system should always be presented associated to certain proof heuristics — even when the
choice of such heuristics turns out not to affect the use of the system in actually designing
successful derivations.
Designing a proof system that only allows its user a very small number of options for
the construction of her proofs is often a poor and unrealistic alternative. Equipping the
user with variegated tools-for-thought and proof techniques seems much more advisable. If
this generous education process is carried out wisely, then much longer after the student
has completely forgotten what she has once proven she might still know how to approach
new (or the same old) problems, and go about solving them. The student had better learn
how to construct a mathematical argument for a direct proof, an existential one, proofs by
reduction, by contraposition or by cases, learn the essential forms of induction, learn the
basic useful combinatorial principles. And she should learn how to refute a conjecture by a
counter-example along with its corresponding step by step justification. What exactly she
happens to end up proving, as long as it meets her professed goal, is often less important
than the increased expertise acquired by her in employing the appropriate strategies towards
accomplishing the task at hand.
3 A case study: the TryLogic
We here briefly assess a tool that embodies some of the above discussed teaching principles.
Its design was based on a number of preexisting tools, following the IMS interoperability
standards for distributed learning2, and may be integrated as an external tool to any Virtual
Learning Environment3. A major interactive theorem prover4 is used by our tool through
the ProofWeb interface5. Finally, students are intended to learn how to use the system
exclusively through the TryLogic6 system, an infrastructure consisting of an interactive
tutorial, based on a successful online system for teaching programming languages7. Students
have common access to a number of exercises to practice their skills with natural deduction,
and typically they will receive directly in their areas a number of personalized exercises
concerning: randomly chosen challenges involving carefully handcrafted conjectures to
be proven; computer-generated exercises involving conjectures to be refuted; a number
of computer-generated challenges in which they are not told whether the corresponding
conjectures should be proven, or else refuted. The latter two groups of propositional-level
2 See http://www.imsglobal.org/lti/index.html.
3 We happened to use Moodle (https://moodle.org/) to that purpose.
4 We have used a standard formal theory for natural deduction implemented in Coq (https://coq.inria.
fr/), to which I have added primitive rules for bi-implication, and we implemented in Coq also a
refutation theory for reasoning with the notion of satisfaction in formal semantics.
5 We have in fact installed our own ProofWeb (http://proofweb.cs.ru.nl/) local server, and extended
it to correctly display the trees from both our full natural deduction theory and our refutation theory.
6 Our system is available at http://lolita.dimap.ufrn.br/trylogic.
7 See http://try.ocamlpro.com/.
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exercises are produced by a tool8 implemented over the SAT-solver Limboole9.
In my understanding, the whole process of writing proof scripts with the help of a proof
assistant helps the students see proofs as instructions to be executed in order to dynamically
explore a problem-solving challenge, even if that does not perfectly match the static proof-
theory that they learn from the mathematical textbooks. The difficulty of the task, in which
we strictly control the amount of automation that we allow the students to use, makes them
ponder about how useful it may be to entertain a strategical approach to a given challenge,
and the nature of the task and the easy interaction with and responsiveness of the underlying
media encourages them to do some heuristic exploration through trial and error.
Before TryLogic, our group had invested for a few years on the Logicamente (cf. [11]),
a growing collection of Learning Objects combined with the respective learning scripts,
expositions, tasks and activities on subjects of Logic. The latter suite of tools was largely
independent from other existing tools, and was developed ab nihilo through the collaborative
effort of students that got involved in the project and were evaluated by their contributions
to it. My impression about the project Logicamente, as fun as it might have been to work
on, is that it was much more successful, from a pedagogical viewpoint, for the students that
implemented its modules than for other students who used these modules later on. I am
not trying now to sell TryLogic (and its associated tools) to you, even though I would be
delighted if you bought it (and it is free of cost). What I feel to be really important about
this new project (which we report upon in more detail in [10]) is that it is entirely based on
exploring the teaching principles discussed in the previous section, for whose convenience and
effectiveness I do not intend to offer here independent evidence except for the fact that a few
dozen students have had very fruitful interactions with TryLogic along the last three years.
Coda
The critical transition from high school to higher education has —and with a good reason—
received increased attention from educators worldwide. Two distinct paths might be taken
by in individual undergoing post-secondary education, namely: focusing on technical content
that adds to know how, or investing on a scientific education that presupposes a frame of
mind not dispensing with the know why. It has been eloquently argued elsewhere that Logic
has a secure role in teaching proof and that this would be better promoted by emphasizing
general principles leading to deeper understanding, rather than by focusing on concrete
narrow problem-solving strategies; more generally, teaching logical reasoning “builds students’
confidence in the rationality of the mathematical enterprise and helps allay their fear of
failure” (cf. [4]).
All education starts from personal reflections. The present paper has collected my own
reflections, at the present date, on the topic of ‘tools for teaching logic’, and what we can
learn from and with such tools. Scientific discussions concerning education, though, cannot
end at the level of intuition. We need data.
In the above I have proposed that Proof Theory should redefine proofs as dynamical
objects, have argued about the advantages of treating proofs as executable code, and of
testing the understanding of definitions by inquiring about the conditions in which they
fail to apply, have commented upon the contributions given by certain computer-inspired
8 The Conjectures Generator is available at http://lolita.dimap.ufrn.br/logicamente-ge/, with
open source code available at http://github.com/terrematte/logic-propgenerator.
9 Available at http://fmv.jku.at/limboole/.
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analogies, and finally I have briefly discussed the importance of exercising one’s mathematical
thinking by acquiring a number of skills polished by the intelligent use of proof strategies.
We should always aim at achieving maximal pedagogical effect. The best way of measuring
this, however, is probably not by bragging about how well the students succeed in the tasks
we assign them with our own tools and measure with our own rulers, but by their later
performance in other tasks that demand similar competences. Still, data needs to be collected
to test whether our teaching principles are sound and far-reaching.
If arguments aim at convincing, the same effect may be achieved ad baculum. We
had better not teach our students to resort to sticks, though. Many novice students have
serious trouble telling the difference betweeen a proof and, say, a broccoli plantation. Talent
and experience are needed for recognizing both successful and failed proofs. In the same
way that you should not dare teaching formal grammar to a student that is still being
alphabetized, I believe that students had better be repeatedly exposed to real-world proofs
before you endeavor teaching them formal logic and proof techniques. The particular tool
I have described in the previous section was introduced in blended learning, and used
concepts of Cognitive Load Theory in its instructional design. I tend to believe, however,
that the teaching principles discussed in this paper can —and should— be carried over to
corresponding theoretical investigations, as well as to other tools and learning theories.
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